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Abstract:  
We suggest an approach to assessing Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) as a step towards informed 
resource allocation and operation when planning to cope with CI disruptions in the context of Emergency 
Management or multi stakeholder planning. The approach is capabilities-based, where a capability is 
defined as a combination of assets, resources and routines specifically arranged to accomplish a critical 
task and assure a key objective. The capabilities (intra- and inter-institutional) are grouped into clusters 
according to the resilience phase (preventive, absorptive, adaptive and restorative) where they are 
invoked; and according to the system type (technical, operational, social, and economic) which they 
belong to. An overall resilience capability building cycle completes the framework, enabling a systematic 
implementation of relevant capabilities and making gap analysis with regard to resilience deficits. A 
simplified test case exemplifying the use of the framework in the context of a regional public-private 
collaboration for CIR is provided. 
Keywords: Critical Infrastructure, Resilience Assessment, Capability-Based Planning, Emergency 
Management, Public-Private Partnership, Gap Analysis 
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1. Introduction 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) can be defined as those assets or systems that are critical for the maintenance 
of vital societal functions, providing services that society and citizens rely on in their daily life (EC, 
2008) - i.e. power and water supply systems, healthcare, transport, electronic communications systems, 
banking. Risks and losses of the society due to inadvertent and deliberate CI disruptions gradually 
increased considerably. This is explained by a number of reasons (Setola, Luiijf & Theocharidou, 2016): 
1. liberalization and privatization of infrastructures, 
2. the increased use of information and communication technologies to support, monitor, and 
control CI, 
3. urbanization that pushes the utilization of old infrastructures to their limits, 
4. the increasing interconnection, (supply) chaining and dependencies of infrastructure services, 
5. the provision of service availability 24/7, and 
6. adversaries of the society attempting to harm as much as possible and create havoc. 
The recognition of the risks stemming from these trends has brought into question the efficiency of 
risk analyses and subsequent risk handling to cope with them. Current risk analysis methods identify 
hazards or hazardous scenarios possibly occurring in a system, their likelihoods, and the severity of the 
consequences. Subsequent risk handling focuses on implementing measures to prevent hazards and 
mitigate their consequences if they have taken place; and bring the risks to an acceptable level. 
1 To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: igko@dtu.dk 
                                                          
Few factors make this form of protection unrealistic for many CI systems. The large complexity of 
these systems makes the risk analysis of many individual components and their dependences cost and 
time prohibitive. The uncertainties associated with vulnerabilities of these systems, combined with the 
unpredictability of climatic stresses and deliberate adverse activities, challenge our ability to understand 
and manage them. To address these challenges, resilience must be built into modern complex socio-
technical systems to help them quickly recover and adapt when adverse events do occur (Linkov et al., 
2014). Resilience approaches are built on the assumption that not all disruptive events involving complex 
CI systems can be prevented and that there is a need to create more resilient CIs that can reduce chances 
of a shock, absorb it and quickly recover if it occurs. Resilience management is not a substitute for risk 
management. Resilience management goes beyond risk management and is a complementary set of 
activities that uses strategies of service restoration and adaptation to improve traditional risk 
management. 
To define resilience of CI we distinguish the following five goals of the resilient system: (1) prevent 
disruption of service to the public, (2) absorb the consequences of any disruption, (3) restore (recover) 
quickly normal performance, and (4) adapt to unforeseen scenarios of disruption (short-term adaptation) 
and adapt to possibly different circumstances of operation (long-term adaptation). The overarching goal 
is to (5) prepare to fulfil the four named goals. Thus, resilience of CI is termed as the ability of the 
system to achieve these five goals. 
The preparedness goal is understood as preparedness to prevent, to absorb, to restore, and to adapt, 
which is in contrast to how preparedness is understood by emergency management agencies that prepare 
only for emergencies. 
The five defined resilience goals are in line with Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8, 2011) aimed 
at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States. This document refers to five mission 
areas (prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery) and the overarching preparedness goal. 
Preparedness includes a range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and 
improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from 
incidents. 
It is not an objective of the current paper to discuss a great variety of definitions of resilience that can 
be found in abundance in the literature. However, in the following section we refer to some of them that 
have given rise to operational approaches to assessing the resilience capacities of systems, including CI.  
To plan, enhance and manage resilience, some metrics are required that are “both precise to measure 
individual system qualities and generalizable to inform resource allocation and operations. To date, the 
failure to understand resilience in the context of these complex systems has precluded the creation of an 
actionable metrics framework to inform resilience decisions.” (Linkov et al., 2013a, p. 1) 
The current paper describes an approach to resilience analysis of CI that outputs metrics that are the 
assessments of resilience capacities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 draws and overviews key concepts and 
existing frameworks for resilience assessment. Section 3 describes a new model for resilience capabilities 
assessment of CI systems. In Section 4 the conceptual model is implemented into a proper resilience 
building cycle. Section 5 offers a test case referring to a regional CI system. Finally, we draw some 
concluding remarks and lines for the future enhancement of the framework. 
 
2. Overview of the benchmarked frameworks and key concepts 
Considerable research in the recent years has focused on CI resilience measurement (e.g. Bertocchi et 
al., 2016; Jovanovic et al., 2016, Prior, 2015; Petit et al., 2013), while there were few attempts to 
operationalize resilience, especially considering the characteristics of CI emergencies (e.g. 
interdependent, multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder). When reviewing literature, we sought to select only 
those approaches that are operational and that produce as the outcome some resilience assessment 
metrics. We screened out the others that are simply conceptual frameworks and do not provide any 
measures of individual system qualities. The review disclosed that there is a relatively small number of 
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frameworks of a direct relevance to infrastructure resilience; and it is noticeable that most of them (see, 
for example Gibson & Tarrant, 2010) are either theoretical or conceptual and therefore aim primarily at 
clarifying and defining interrelated aspects of resilience rather than serving as operational guidance for 
the assessments of resilience. However, a few frameworks have an explicit both theoretical and practical 
aim and are applicable to different domains. We have selected six that had a promise of being practical 
and applicable to CI; and that were regarded as potential candidates for benchmarking with the 
framework we have developed.  
One of them, which is described in Francis & Bekera (2014), however, was discarded because, firstly, 
it has many elements that are in common with the other frameworks selected; and, secondly, the measure 
of resilience that the authors introduce is based on predicting a system functionality curve after a 
disturbance has occurred. We do not consider that this approach outputs an informative metric that can be 
used to characterise an existing level of resilience of CI. This approach suits better as a post-accident 
resilience assessment method. 
Another resilience assessment framework that has been developed to a very practical level and tested 
on a real case is described in Brown et al. (2017). It focuses on CI and is a valuable development in the 
resilience assessment area. However, it analyses thoroughly only one dimension, which is the 
organizational resilience; while we strive to capture the other dimensions of CI (physical, financial and 
social), including organizational. 
One more operational resilience assessment tool is the one that is practised by London Resilience 
Partnership, and that supports planning arrangements in London as a resilient city. As declared on the 
london.gov.uk site, the approach suggests focussing on developing core functional capabilities which 
underpin planning resilience work. While the approach exhibits operability, the scarce information about 
it does not allow us to benchmark our developed framework with it.  
All in all, we ended up with three frameworks that were scrutinised, and used to benchmark the 
framework that was developed as part of the READ (Resilience Capacities Assessment for Critical 
Infrastructures Disruptions)i EU project, and which we refer to as the READ framework.  
The first approach that we refer to is the MCEER framework for quantitative assessment and 
enhancement of the seismic resilience of communities (Bruneau et al., 2003) developed by researchers at 
what was formerly known as the Multidisciplinary and National Center for Earthquake Engineering 
Research at University of Buffalo. The other one is the Sandia resilience assessment framework applied 
to infrastructure and economic systems (Vugrin et al., 2010) developed by researchers at the Sandia 
National Lab. Finally, the third framework is referred to as the Resilience Matrix (RM) framework 
(Linkov et al., 2013a; 2013b; 2014) and that was developed by a group of researchers of the 
Environmental Lab, Engineer Research and Development, US Army Corps of Engineers. 
The following are the three definitions of resilience that underlie the three mentioned frameworks 
Definition 1 (MCEER): Resilience is the ability of the system to reduce the chances of a shock, to 
absorb a shock if it occurs (abrupt reduction of performance) and to recover quickly after a shock (re-
establish normal performance). (Bruneau et al., 2003, p. 736) 
Definition 2 (Sandia): Given the occurrence of a particular disruptive event (or set of events), the 
resilience of a system to that event (or events) is the ability to efficiently reduce both the magnitude and 
duration of the deviation from targeted system performance levels. (Vugrin et al., 2010, p. 6). 
Definition 3 (NASii): Resilience is the ability of a system to perform four functions with respect to 
adverse events: (i) planning and preparation, (ii) absorption, (iii) recovery, and (iv) adaptation (Cutter et 
al., 2013). This definition was adopted by the developers of the RM framework. 
These definitions provide different departing points for the resilience assessment frameworks and 
predefine from the outset the boundaries demarcating frameworks’ operational directions. 
Definition 1 introduces explicitly what the authors call the key measures of resilience (Bruneau et al., 
2003): reduced probabilities of shocks, reduced consequences from failures and reduced recovery time. 
“A resilient system is one that displays the “positive” measures of resilience” (Bruneau et al., 2003). The 
“positive” means that the system displays reduced failure probabilities, consequences and/or recovery 
time compared to other systems similar in functionality or, perhaps, compared to a kind of a reference 
system. 
Definition 2 emphasizes that resilience is determined by a combination of the impact of the event on 
the system, the time and cost required for the system to recover. Despite the cost does not appear 
explicitly in the definition, however, the authors clarify that “the ability to efficiently reduce both the 
magnitude and duration” implies cost efficiency. It is different from the MCEER definition in that it is 
conditional on a particular disruptive event and recovery cost (or more general, “recovery effort”) which 
is another “key” measure of resilience. 
Definition 3 in turn explicitly says that the two more phases (planning/preparation and adaptation) 
should be subjected to the resilience analysis, which is implemented in the RM framework. 
Both the MCEER and Sandia framework suggest the following four categories as dimensions of 
resilience: technical, organizational, social, and economic (TOSE). In this view, a CI is a complex socio-
technical system the state of which can be defined in this four-dimensional space. These dimensions can 
also be referred to as system’s parts, components or subsystems. 
The MCEER framework also nominates robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity as 
resilience properties (Bruneau et al., 2003). These properties are undoubtedly important for system 
resilience. Nevertheless, this set of properties does not appear complete to characterize resilience. For 
example, it seems we need a property that characterizes the ability to prevent and secure the CI against 
shocks and interruptions. Other properties such as survivability, susceptibility, vulnerability and 
adaptiveness appear also relevant for resilience characterization. 
The Sandia authors (Vugrin et al., 2010), despite taking as their basis the MCEER framework, avoid 
using this taxonomy of resilience and system properties. Instead they use “system capacities that 
determine system resilience”: absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and restorative capacity. 
The shift from “resilience properties” to “system capacities that determine system resilience” appears 
more consistent conceptually, as it is bounded to the event management cycle, the completeness of which 
is easy to agree upon. In the view of the resilience definition we adopt and that was given in the 
Introduction, the READ framework complements the group of resilience capacities with preventive 
capacity. It should be noted though that the use of the three capacities is consistent and complete in 
relation to the Sandia definition (Definition 2), as the prevention phase is not included in their definition 
of resilience. 
According to the Sandia framework (Vugrin et al., 2010), the resilience capacities are enabled by 
“resilience enhancement features” that are rather vaguely defined but explained by examples. For 
example, surveillance cameras, movement sensors and other technical solutions can help prevent 
malicious acts against CI or any other assets and people. If properly operated, they enhance preventive 
capacity. A storage can enhance the absorptive capacity, if a chemical plant is disabled but a large amount 
of collocated storage of its product is undamaged. If a hurricane destroys power lines, leaving customers 
without electricity, emergency generators even for a limited number of customers will enhance system 
adaptive capacity. Alternative power supplies can also enhance restorative capacity of the system, if 
recovery needs power and the main source of power is unavailable. 
The RM framework breaks down the system into subsystems differently. It distinguishes the following 
four major components: physical, information, cognitive and social. These four, combined with the stages 
preceding and following the disruptive event (prepare, absorb, recover and adapt) determine the space 
(the Resilience Matrix) in which the resilience of the system is analysed (Fox-Lent, Bates & Linkov, 
2015; Linkov et al., 2013a). This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The Resilience Matrix  
(source: Fox-Lent, Bates & Linkov, 2015; Linkov et al., 2013a) 
 
Each cell of the RM describes what is important for developing application-specific quantitative and 
qualitative measures of each function; and it provides guidelines for resilience metrics that need to be 
developed and combined to measure overall system resilience (Linkov et al., 2013a). The sixteen cells 
provide a general description of the functionality of the system through an adverse event. For example, 
the Information-Recover cell is assigned a rating reflecting the ability of the system to collect (monitor) 
and share data. The Social-Adapt cell gets a rating according to the capacity of the affected people to 
modify behavior and sustain changes beyond the immediate incident response. As soon as scores for all 
cells have been assigned, they can be aggregated to represent a snapshot of overall system resilience. This 
can be monitored over time, used for comparison with similar systems, or examined more closely to 
identify gaps in the capacities of system resilience (Eisenberg et al., 2014; Fox-Lent, Bates & Linkov, 
2015).  
In order to be prepared for an unexpected evolvement of an incident into an emergency situation, 
several countries have adopted a capabilities-based planning approach as part of their emergency 
preparedness work. The strategy of capabilities-based planning is to prepare for a large variety of threats 
and risks instead of simply preparing for specific scenarios (Lindbom et al., 2015a), the so-called all-
hazard approach. Several countries, including Australia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the 
UK, the USA identify and assess the core capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the 
effects of, respond to, and recover from threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the society, 
including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters (Lindbom et al., 
2015b; PPD-8, 2011). Despite we find the conceptual and methodological basis for this approach unclear 
and the qualitative scale for assessing the capabilities ambiguous, the rationale appears to us very sound 
and worth being further researched and operationalized. 
As a step to operationalizing the capabilities-based approach, the concept of capability itself has been 
defined in different ways. For example, a capability is simply defined as a resource and “existing 
capability assessment methods often specify indicators for capability, e.g. if plans exist and if drills have 
been performed” (Lindbom et al., 2015b, p. 1). Another example of the definition of capability is given in 
(Lindbom et al., 2015a, p. 47): it is “the uncertainty about the severity of the consequences of the activity 
given the occurrence of the initiating event and the performed task”. Many other definitions of capability 
are cited in Lindbom et al. (2015a). 
While finding some of the definitions satisfactorily to some extent for our purpose – which is 
resilience assessment of CI – we have undertaken a thorough review of the concept and suggest our 
definition of the concept that is another corner stone of the READ resilience assessment framework. This 
is described in the following section. 
The above three introduced resilience frameworks and the capabilities-based planning approach are 
the four underlying operational methods which the READ resilience assessment framework is rooted in.  
3. Building the model of CI system resilience 
The READ resilience assessment framework is capabilities-based. This means that the resilience 
assessment of CI is carried out thorough the assessment of the relevant system’s capabilities that 
influence the resilience of CI and control its desired level. That is, identification of resilience capabilities 
is the first step to undertake. In this view, a clear definition of a capability should be given, and then 
capabilities should be related to the goals of a resilient CI system. To remind the reader, the goals were 
defined in the introduction. 
Our definition of capability is compounded of the following two: 
(1) Capability is a feature, faculty, ability or process that can be developed or improved. Capability is 
a collaborative process that can be deployed and through which individual competencies can be 
applied and made use of, for given objectives and goals. The relevant question for capability is: 
“How can we get done what we need to get done?” (Vincent, 2008). 
(2) Capability is measure of the ability of an entity (department, organisation, person, system) to 
achieve its objectives, and therefore also and in particular, in relation to its overall missioniii. 
 
Despite the definitions are very different and rather controversial, they provide us with key elements 
for the definition we adopt: Capability of an entity (organisation, person, system) is a feature, faculty or 
process that promotes the achievement of its objectives. 
The capabilities that promote the resilience five goals (objectives) are called the resilience 
capabilities. Or differently said, resilience capabilities are defined as enablers of activities and functions 
that serve the resilience goals.  
We further operationalise the definition of a resilience capability of CI as follows: 
A resilience capability of CI is a coherent compound of different entities - belonging to one or more of 
the following three groups: assets, resources and practices/routines – that promotes the achievement of 
resilience objectives. These terms, assets, resources and routines, are used in parts of the literature on 
management and business as well as that on quality improvement and safety management, but with 
different meanings. 
The term ‘asset’ is used to refer to tangible and intangible items that can be owned – and therefore 
also includes knowledge and information systems. Items that can be owned will by inference have a long 
term value to their owners – otherwise there is no point in ownership.  
By ‘resources’ we aim to capture tools, consumables and competencies that make it possible to make 
use of assets, and that are subject to availability. Without resources some assets may not have their value. 
This is like a wind turbine (which is an asset) does not have any service value if there is no wind (which 
in our context is referred to as a resource). Another example would be expertise, skills and competencies 
necessary for making use of assets, that also may become unavailable (human resources). The distinction 
between assets and resources is sometimes context dependent – so what counts as a resource in one 
context may be an asset in another (say, ambulances, and software programs). 
Finally, ‘routines’ refers to both explicit procedures for doing things and to the informal practices 
people and communities have and which are not articulated in procedures and prescriptions, yet shared as 
tacit background knowledge and know-how. 
Short definitions of these terms are the following:  
• An asset is an item of ownership that has exchange value; includes intangibles such as 
knowledge systems. 
• A resource is a tool, consumable, or human being possessing competences required to make use 
of assets for achieving given objectives. 
• A routine is defined as the way things are done, possibly codified as an explicit procedure, within 
a community or social group, a pattern of activities (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). 
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As mentioned, in some cases it is not obvious whether a certain item should be classified either as an 
asset or a resource, and the classification issue must be resolved by convention. 
Let us consider a simple example to illustrate how a resilience capability can be broken down into the 
defined compounds. Assume the following capability is found important for building and maintaining 
resilience of a system: “Provision of access to required information”. What is this capability compounded 
from? 
• Assets: Information (can be paper medium, e-repository, audio records, etc.) 
• Resource: Tools such as communication links, computing facilities, competencies to operate and 
make use of these.  
• Routines/procedures: Instructions for getting access to the target information which may include 
authorisation, credentials for e-access, etc. 
The space in which resilience capabilities of CIs are defined is restricted to the two dimensions 
(Figure 2): (1) types of the CI subsystems or components (TOSE) and (2) capacity groups (preventive, 
absorptive, adaptive, and restorative). Specific solutions or mechanisms that will be identified within this 
space are resilience capabilities that contribute to making the system more resilient, i.e., that enhance at 
least one of its resilience capacity groups.  
 
System types 
Resilience capacities 
Preventive Absorptive Adaptive Restorative 
Technical     
Organisational     
Social     
Economic     
Figure 2: Resilience capabilities' characterisation space 
In times of a service disruption and in a post-crisis phase a number of emergency responders, 
authorities and possibly social groups will be involved to cope with and recover from the disruption. 
They all are external organisations and institutions that in concerted actions with the operator of the CI 
will have to respond to the disruption and restore the services. In this view, it is not only the intra-
capabilities of the CI and its operator that make the CI resilient. The inter-institutional capabilities 
enabling concerted actions among all the involved parties play as great role as intra- institutional 
capabilities. That is to say, the space in which the resilience capabilities are defined should be refined and 
complemented by one more dimension classifying the capabilities into inter- and intra- institutional. 
The inter-institutional model of capability building consists in the following. To enable inter- 
institutional relations and activities, there must be firstly intra- institutional capabilities in place. That is 
to say, among intra-institutional capabilities contributing to the system resilience there are some 
capabilities that allow establishing inter-institutional relations and conducting activities. The inter-
institutional relations can have different gradations that are displayed in Figure 3. 
 
 INTER-INSTITUTIONAL MODEL (National and cross-border) 
Capabilities Independent Coordinate Cooperate Collaborate Meta-organisation 
Collaborate + share      
Authority 
Cooperate + share 
Power      
Coordinate + share 
Activities and 
Resources      
Independent + 
share 
Information      
Intra-Institutional 
Resilience      
Figure 3: Inter-institutional escalation model (adapted from Crosby & Bryson, 2005) 
 
At this point we have all the bricks needed to describe the CI system resilience or, differently said, to 
build the model of the CI system resilience. Generally, building the resilience model consists in the 
identification of intra- and inter-institutional resilience capabilities for each type of the CI subsystems 
(TOSE) and for each resilience capacity group; and then in the breaking down each capability into the 
three entities: assets, resources, and routines/procedures. Figure 4 is a visual summary of building the 
model for each type of the subsystem. 
Ideally, the phase of building the CI system resilience ends up with an ‘exhaustive’ repository of the 
resilience capabilities available to control the resilience of the CI system of interest. 
 
Figure 4: Resilience capacity conceptualisation and mapping 
4. Resilience assessment 
The next step on the way to the assessment of the resilience is rooted in the results of risk analysis of a 
specific CI system and consists in identifying system vulnerabilities. A common definition of 
vulnerability is a fault or weakness that reduces or limits a system’s ability to withstand a threat or to 
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resume a new stable condition (see, for example Aven, 2007). It is important to stress that, coherently 
with an all-hazard approach, this is not hazards and threats that have to be primarily identified but 
vulnerabilities.  
Vulnerability is an event or a state that characterises the CI system. In terms of event trees connecting 
initiating events (possibly hazards and threats) and possible adverse consequences, a vulnerability lies 
somewhere in between the two events (cause and consequence). There can be many hazard/threat 
evolution scenarios that may result in adverse consequences penetrating through a breach called 
vulnerability. That is to say, vulnerability is a conditional event on the one hand, and an attribute of a CI 
system on the other. By focusing on vulnerabilities we can reduce a great deal of scenarios, and by doing 
this, we can claim that we prepare for a wide variety of hazards and threats rather than for specific 
scenarios. This also realises our strive for coping with the unexpected, meaning that whatever hazards 
and threats are, making the system less vulnerable is a step toward resilience enhancement. 
It is appropriate and constructive to have a prioritized list of vulnerabilities weighted by their 
likelihoods and the severity of possible followed consequences. 
Given the vulnerabilities are identified and prioritized, the mapping of the capabilities against them 
provides an overview of what capabilities exist to reduce the vulnerabilities and/or cope with the 
potential adverse consequences. In fact, making the mapping between the vulnerabilities and capabilities 
means establishing an interface between the results of risk analysis and the model of the CI system 
resilience in the form of resilience capabilities. This is visualised in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Resilience capability assessment coupled to results of risk analysis 
 
Now the assessment of CI resilience can be carried out. To do so, a qualitative assessment scale should be 
adopted. As an example of such a scale we can refer to the Swedish statutory instructions (Palmqvist, 
Tehlera & Shoaiba, 2014), which proposes capability assessment according to an ordinal four-level scale: 
(1) Good capability, (2) Good capability in general, (3) Some, but inadequate, capability, and (4) No or a 
very inadequate capability. Finer scales with a greater number of levels can be adopted for the 
assessment, as it was done in our case example (Section 5). 
At this phase, each capability linked to the identified vulnerabilities is assessed according to the 
adopted scale. As at the time being acceptance resilience criteria do not exist, a target resilience value 
should be deliberated with stakeholders. We do not provide any guidance now on how to organize such 
deliberation. However, taking into account of how risk acceptance criteria are built, we can expect that 
the stakeholders can perhaps agree on what level is acceptable and what is unacceptable; and whether 
enhancements of resilience are justified cost-beneficially in case of being indecisive between accepting 
and unaccepting.  
We assume that the derivation of a target resilience value is achievable; and if so, a gap analysis can 
be done between the achieved level and the target level. The case study that we conducted in the 
Lombardy region (Italy) exhibits positive attitude of the involved stakeholders towards the acceptance of 
the target resilience level.  
Maintaining continuously the resilience of a CI is seen as a resilience capability building cycle that 
consists of four steps (Figure 6): 
1) In the first step the current state of the resilience capabilities is assessed. Each organization 
performs its own capability assessment. 
2) In the second step a Gap Analysis is performed. The Gap Analysis provides a comprehensive 
overview of available capabilities and quantitative indicators, enabling to easily identify the weak 
points of CI resilience. It gives also a clear clue about where the future improvements should be 
focused, considering CI subsystems against the resilience capacity groups. A target value for each 
capability is deliberated considering the accidents and related system vulnerabilities (i.e. Risk 
Analysis). Target values aim to cover all the gaps and make the system completely fitting with its 
exposure to the context. By comparing target to the current levels, the gaps in the capabilities are 
identified.  
3) In the third step, the objectives are set, and the implementation plan is decided upon. Objective 
values identify the expected improvements to be achieved during the next planning cycle, hence 
they could be lower than the target values. 
4) The fourth step (which is also the first step of the next planning cycle) is where the resilience 
capabilities are reassessed and reviewed after a single improvement cycle. 
 
 
Figure 6: Resilience capabilities building cycle 
5. Case example 
In order to provide an example of how the READ framework could be used in practice we refer to a case 
of convenience related to the Public-Private Collaboration and Programme for CIP-R in Lombardy 
Region (Italy) where some of the authors are involved providing technical support. We here provide only 
a brief and simplified overview of the case, with the sole purpose of explaining the resilience assessment 
process. 
Lombardy is one of the 20 Italian regions, located in the north. A sixth of Italy's population lives in 
Lombardy (around 10 million citizens) and it accounts for around 20% of Italy's GDP, making it the most 
populous and richest region in the country and one of the richest in Europe.  
A study carried out by a team of academics and consultants in 2011, provided a complete picture of 
the actual status of the vulnerability of regional CI nodes and the corresponding emergency management 
processes adopted by the most important CI operators. The follow-up modelling study of the performance 
of the regional infrastructural system and a vital node analysis returned a ranking list of the most critical 
nodes, or clusters of nodes (Trucco et al., 2012). 
The first two phases preceding the resilience assessment phase were (1) system and environment 
specification, and (2) system characterization, each containing the following sub-tasks (Figure 7): 
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1) System and environment specification determines the compounds and elements of the system 
relevant for its resilience; and the organisational and environmental contexts. More specifically, the 
following was determined, identified and characterised: 
a. Infrastructures and their parts (i.e. assets) 
b. Organisations involved (both public and private) 
c. Hazards and threats identification 
d. Resilience capabilities determination (the list of core capabilities identified by FEMAiv was 
used as a baseline list for the analysis, see Appendix). 
To clarify the difference between a hazard and a threat we refer to the definitions given in the Glossary of 
Society for Risk Analysisv. According to it a hazard is defined as a risk source where the potential 
consequences relate to harm. Hazards could for example be associated with energy (e.g. explosion, fire), 
material (toxic or eco-toxic), biota (pathogens) and information (panic communication). Threat is a risk 
source as well, though, commonly used in relation to security applications (but also in relation to other 
applications, for example the threat of an earthquake) 
2) System characterization involves two main steps: 
a. Accident specification – generic accidents were described and documented as the scenarios 
of reference for the assessment. They are, for example, electrical blackout events, heavy 
snowfalls, flooding incidents, and other. Types of accidents to focus on were agreed upon 
with the stakeholders and a combination of hazards and threats and their magnitude were 
chosen against which the resilience was going to be assessed. 
b. Asset vulnerability analysis was conducted to output the degree of vulnerability of each 
asset when facing accidents of interest defined at the previous step. 
 
 
Figure 7: Resilience assessment and gap analysis process 
 
After having the preliminary work of the above two phases completed, the resilience assessment 
phase was carried out. It was done for a number of generic accident type events. For each type of 
accident, different capabilities were assigned to organizations having a role in coping with the accident; 
and it was described in which way the capability is specifically implemented in each organization (assets-
resources-routines). 
Table 1 is an extract from the analysis describing and breaking down relevant capabilities the 
resilience of which was further assessed. 
 
Table 1. An example of capability specifications 
Capability Elements Organisations 
Intelligence and 
Information Sharing 
(IIS) 
Assets: Information exchange system; map of multi-actor 
information flows during disaster management. 
Resources: Personnel in the control rooms of the CI and 
Situation Room (Civil protection); social media and other web 
resources.  
Routines: Information sharing protocol and procedure 
Regional 
Government 
(RG) and 
partners of CI 
operators 
Public Information 
and Warning (PIW) 
Assets: Information to users with all active and passive channels 
available (various messaging, network, toll-free number, SMS, 
company website). 
Resources: Staff and other resources at emergency sites to 
redirect traffic and intervene. 
Routines: Communication plan capable of informing users of the 
location and type of emergency 
Road operator 
Logistics and 
Transportation 
under EM (LT) 
Assets: Agreements for replacement services with bus companies 
wherever possible. 
Resources: Bus fleets and drivers of road transport companies. 
Routines: Internal process for backup service activation and SLA 
on responsiveness. 
Rail operator 
Operational 
Coordination (OC) 
Assets: Operational Centers, Workstations for Operational 
Assistance, Emergency Workstations  
Resources: Available (on-call) personnel in various units. If 
necessary also from other territories/regions 
Routines: Emergency Management procedures 
Electricity 
(Distribution) 
Operator 
Screening, Search 
and Detection (SSD) 
Assets: None 
Resources: None 
Routines: None 
Rail operator 
 
The capacity scores of the resilience capabilities used in this example are of the six-level scale: 
Missing (0), Very Low (1), Low (2), Medium (3), High (4), and Very High (5). The definition and 
interpretation of the levels is an important issue that should be carefully addressed, as the attributed 
numbers are inputs to decision making. Finding best definitions is still an open issue that should be 
further researched. In the Lombardy region study we used the definition of the capacity levels as shown 
in Figure 8. However, there are different views on how the levels should be defined and interpreted. For 
example, another way of assessing capabilities is by means of maturity grids (Maier, Moultrie & 
Clarkson, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 8: A possible definition of the assessment scale 
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The next step – which is part of the resilience assessment phase – is to classify each capability into a 
correct cell of the resilience capabilities’ space as defined by Figure 2, as well as to determine whether 
the capability is inter- or intra-institutional, and which stakeholder is concerned. Clearly, there can be 
very different formats to compactly represent this information. Figure 9 is a straightforward example of 
how it can be done. The carried out study was limited to the Technical and Organisational dimension of 
capabilities’ characterisation space, and this is why only these two are exemplified in the table. The 
exemplified current resilience values (CR) and target values (TR) are indicative and may differ from those 
provided by the experts. 
 
Preventive CR TR Absorptive CR TR Adaptive CR TR Restorative CR TR
SSDi(Rail) 0 2 IISI(RG) 3 4 IISI(RG) 2 4 IISI(RG) 2 4
PIWi(Road) 4 5 PIWi(Road) 4 5
COi,I(Elec) 4 5 COi,I(Elec) 3 5
SSDi(Rail) 0 1 IISI(RG) 3 4 IISI(RG) 2 4 IISI(RG) 3 4
PIWi(Road) 3 5 PIWi(Road) 3 4 LTi,I(Rail) 3 3
LTi,I(Rail) 3 4 LTi,I(Rail) 3 4
COi,I(Elec) 3 5 COi,I(Elec) 3 5
Social
E conomic
System types
Technical
O rganisational
Resilience capacities
- Abbreviations in bold and capitals are the names of the capabilities 
- Subscript ‘i’ stands for intra- while ‘I’ for inter-institutional capability 
- The labels in the parentheses indicate the organisation 
- CR stands for ‘Current Resilience’ level, while TR for ‘Target Resilience’ value 
Figure 9: Resilience capabilities assessment dashboard 
 
Information provided in Figure 9 is a rich output of the resilience analysis and input to decision 
making on resilience enhancements and maintenance. First of all, a set of tables – each for a specified 
type of a hazard or threat – provides an overview of available capabilities to cope with disruptive events 
at the different phases of the post- and pre-event. It also provides an overview of the capabilities 
attributed to each stakeholder. The tables can be split into several, each per stakeholder. 
Secondly, the difference between the target values (TR) and achieved levels (CR) of resilience is input 
to the Gap analysis. In the gap analysis (Figure 9), individual gap values can be added up to give a better 
overview along the desired dimension. The gaps can be aggregated across the resilience capacities, 
system types, one or more stakeholders, or across different types of the analysed hazards and threats, in 
which cases they will serve as aggregated indexes indicating the achieved and desirable level of 
resilience. 
As the capability building cycle indicates (Figure 6), the next step is ‘Improvement’. It is governed by 
the outcomes of the gap analysis. And the final phase of the cycle is the review of the new achieved level 
where the resilience capabilities are reassessed and reviewed after a single improvement cycle. 
6. Conclusions 
The role of resilience in augmenting risk management is increasingly acknowledged and has resulted 
in substantial diversity of the definitions of resilience and, as it was demonstrated in this paper, in a 
number of operational frameworks outputting resilience metrics. While the frameworks exhibit little 
standardization, they share several common elements. The experience of applications of these 
frameworks in multiple engineering contexts is still limited, and advancing the fundamental 
understanding and practical application of resilience requires greater attention. Thorough comparison of 
resilience is needed to attempt to extract generalizable principles and operational practical solutions 
supported and accepted by multiple stakeholders and users. 
The presented approach facilitates the implementation of collaborative resilience building process 
against CI disruptions through, since they usually involve more stakeholders and CI sectors. The 
framework helps mapping and assessment of specific technical and organizational capabilities (intra- and 
inter-institutional), identification of missing capabilities, supports making strategic decisions 
(improvement plans) and building collective resilience. 
Until now, the READ framework has gone through the test in which two system dimensions, technical 
and organisational, were looked into. Such pilot application of the framework received a general positive 
feedback from the stakeholders (Di Mauro, 2017; Petrenj et al., 2017). The applicability on the two other 
resilience dimensions (social, economic) should be further explored. The positive feedback from the first 
test application encourages additional framework applications in different contexts and for different 
purposes, for example to design exercises, both table-top of full scale. This will also enable a better 
calibration and validation of capability assessment scale. The further work should also investigate the 
usefulness of the software tool that would support activities in the resilience capabilities building cycle. 
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APPENDIX 
32 core capabilities identified by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the US, in the National 
Preparedness Goal (https://www.fema.gov/core-capabilities) 
 
1 Planning 
2 Public Information and Warning 
3 Operational Coordination 
4 Forensics and Attribution 
5 Intelligence and Information Sharing 
6 Interdiction and Disruption 
7 Screening, Search, and Detection 
8 Access Control and Identity Verification 
9 Cybersecurity 
10 Physical Protective Measures 
11 Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities 
12 Supply Chain Integrity and Security 
13 Community Resilience 
14 Long-term Vulnerability Reduction 
15 Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment 
16 Threats and Hazards Identification 
17 Critical Transportation 
18 Environmental Response/Health and Safety 
19 Fatality Management Services 
20 Fire Management and Suppression 
21 Infrastructure Systems 
22 Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
23 Mass Care Services 
24 Mass Search and Rescue Operations 
25 On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement 
26 Operational Communications 
27 Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services 
28 Situational Assessment 
29 Economic Recovery 
30 Health and Social Services 
31 Housing 
32 Natural and Cultural Resources 
 
i READ is also the abbreviated name of the corresponding EU research project ‘Resilience Capacities 
Assessment for Critical Infrastructures Disruptions’ funded under the CIPS Programme. 
ii NAS is the abbreviation for National Academy of Sciences of the U.S. 
iii Business Dictionary: http://www.businessdictionary.com 
iv https://www.fema.gov/core-capabilities 
v http://www.sra.org/sites/default/files/pdf/SRA-glossary-approved22june2015-x.pdf 
                                                          
